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Abstract 
In refuting Guy Standing’s precariat as a class, we highlight that employment situation, 
worker identity and legal rights are mistakenly taken as theoretical components of class 
formation. Returning to theories of class we use Dahrendorf’s reading of Marx where 
three components of classes, the objective, the subjective, and political struggle, are 
used to define the current formation of the working class in China. Class is not defined 
by status, identity or legal rights, but location in the sphere of production embedded 
within conflictual capital-labour relations. By engaging with the heated debates on the 
rise of a new working class in China, we argue that the blending of employment 
situation and rights in the West with the idea of precarity of migrant workers in China 
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is misleading. Deconstructing the relationship between class and precarity, what we see 
as an unhappy coupling, is central to the paper.  
 
Key Words: precarity, precariat, China, working class, industrial conflict  
Introduction 
 
Guy Standing’s controversial concept of a precariat class has recently been applied to 
China (Standing, 2017). Standing replaces the widely used informal labour by the term 
precariat when extending his studies to China (ibid: 165). He notes:  
“The etymological root of precarious is to ‘beg by prayer’. In other words, it refers 
to a person’s status and a lack of rights within the state. Someone in the precariat 
is above all else a supplicant, dependent on others doing them favors, in response 
to requests” (2017:166).  
In this regard, he differentiates the concepts of informal labour and Marx’s proletariat 
from precariat, and does not use the two concepts to understand working class 
formation in China. In this article, we reject Guy Standing’s dangerous precariat as a 
class concept, and suggest that employment situation, worker identity and legal rights 
are mistakenly taken as theoretical components of class formation (Breman, 2013; 
Munck, 2013). Returning to Marxist classic theories of class, we note that a complex 
of employment situation, lack of rights within the state and the fragmentation of 
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workers in the labour market and/or the sphere of production will only affect class 
solidarity and may prolong the class formation process, but not remove the underlying 
need for expressions of class consciousness and identity. Using Dahrendorf’s (1959) 
reading of Marx, there are three components of classes, the objective, the subjective, 
and political struggle. We suggest that the main pressure point of class formation resides 
not in formal/semi-formal or legal/para-legal status distinctions of workers vis-à-vis the 
state, but in their relative ability to mobilise collectively (e.g. via strikes and protests) 
in relation to their grievous experiences as workers in capitalist labour processes as a 
social activity. 
By engaging with the increasingly acrimonious debates on the rise of a new working 
class in China, we argue that incorporating migrant workers or student interns or 
workers from ex-state-owned enterprises as a precariat is confusing (Standing, 2017). 
Deconstructing the relationship between class and precarity, which we see as an 
unhappy coupling, we offer more clarity on the language on class and status in China. 
To this end we show that the emergent migrant working class in China is hardly to be 
understood as supplicants, waiting for somebody else to do them favors or holding 
misleading perceptions that the state will provide them with protection. Rather, they are 
a new working class empowered at the grid of increasingly severe strikes and collective 
actions, especially since the financial crisis of 2007.   
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In the next section we briefly critique the work of Standing. This is followed by 
an examination of working class formation in China using Marx’s theory of class and 
taking class as a dynamic and organic concept, reflective of the interaction between the 
development of objective shifts in class relations and the subjective (identity and action) 
orientations of workers in the workplace. From this we explore “class in action”, as 
demonstrated by attempts of organizing through class-based associations, and conflicts 
and class actions amongst migrant workers and how labour NGOs support workers in 
industrial communities. We conclude by arguing for a more interactive approach to 
class and workers protests in China, and for greater clarity in terminology around class, 
precarity and employment situation. 
A precarious story of Standing’s precariat  
In the 1960s and 1970s the active debates around a “new working class” applied to 
emerging qualified groups like technical workers, considered a vanguard for all workers 
for French theorists Mallet (1975) and Gorz (1967). The same groups were later 
considered a controlling ‘new middle class’, for structural Marxists, like Poulantzas 
(1978). More recently debates have featured new intermediate groupings in the class 
structure, such as the ‘creative class’ (Florida, 2002) and ‘knowledge workers’ 
(Wuthnow, and Shrum, 1983). In recessionary conditions, the ‘underclass’ (Auletta, 
1982), more recent ‘austariat’ (Mešić, and Woolfson, 2015), and the increasingly 
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influential ‘precariat’ (Standing, 2011) have appeared. The idea of the precariat has 
gone global, entering Chinese discourse through Lee (2016) and others (Swider, 2017; 
Standing, 2017), and contributing to growing debates about the character of new 
working class in China which is our focus in this paper. 
Most theories of new classes build classifications out of market or occupational 
situation, and the trading of new knowledge or ideas in the labour market (Goldthorpe 
et al 1969; Wright 1997). In other words, it is Weberian ideas of occupational classes 
using non-competing exclusive skills that form the basis of class differentiation. 
However, with regard to the ‘precariat’ it is the absence of market security and the 
particular ways of contracting labour power, through short-term, casual or insecure 
exchanges, that is assumed to over-determine the precariat’s class identity against other 
classes.  
In a recent note “The Precariat in China: A Comment on Conceptual Confusion” 
(2017), Standing criticizes the concept of informal labor as an ambiguous theoretical 
construction, and advocates replacing it with the term he coined, the precariat, as the 
most appropriate conceptual tool for understanding the situation of Chinese workers. 
However, while it could be argued that informal labour is imprecise, Standing’s 
recourse to market situation and employment flexibility to define the precariat in the 
class structure and relationship to the state, produces an ill-defined conglomeration of 
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part-timers, casual or temporary workers, seasonal workers, self-employed, agency 
workers, student internees, volunteers, and many others with casual connections to an 
employer. What defines class identity of the precariat is undertaking work in an 
irregular or informal manner – namely their employment situation. It does not matter 
that casualness might be an embedded norm in a sector, such as agriculture and food 
processing, and workers are repeatedly recruited and accustomed to this pattern of 
working. If casually employed such workers are in the precariat. Due to this 
indiscriminate construction, Standing’s precariat has been called a ‘bogus concept’ 
(Breman, 2013). Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2017: 545) note: “Not only does 
labour market insecurity not create a homogeneous ‘precariat’, it does not result in a 
simple polarisation between insiders and outsiders, and affects in different ways social 
groups with contrasting capacities for collective mobilisation.” Standing creates the 
precariat not out of capital-labour conflicts, where power asymmetries are well known, 
but presumed labour-labour conflicts - internal divisions within the working class, with 
those in regular/standard employment judged a privileged ‘salariat’; and those excluded 
from standard employment contracts, a disadvantaged precariat. Standing (2017: 167) 
confuses ‘relations of production’ with market situation and status, and ignores a wealth 
of sociology of class in this area (see Vogt, 2017 for a recent review). He notes that, 
using arguments from his book, that the precariat:  
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“Have distinctive relations of production. This means that lack all seven 
forms of labor-based security built up during the twentieth century as defined by 
laws, regulations, and so-called collective agreements, namely labor market 
security, employment security, job security, work security, skill reproduction 
security, income security, and representation security”.  
These are not relations of production - there is no structural class relationship 
here, but an ideal type secure working class set against ideal type precariat with a 
sevenfold set of insecurities.    
Defining the precariat as lacking the security of employment of the ‘salariat’ makes 
for a problematic designation. Munck (2013: 771-2) notes that: “the precariat is defined 
more or less by what it is not—a mythical, stable working class with full social and 
political rights—and by its vague feelings of anomie and distance from the orthodox 
labour movement”. In what ways are the politics of employment insecurity the source 
of danger? Wright (2016: 135) and Braga (2016) insist that the precariat should not be 
distinguished from the working class, or even it’s more stable and well-off layers. In 
the 1960s the embourgeiosment thesis, suggested workers were being absorbed into the 
middle class because of increased employment and economic security, but empirically 
there was no such shift in class location or identification (Goldthorpe et al, 1969) and 
economic security is not guaranteed in capitalism. Marx noted the general 
8 
 
‘precariousness’ of waged labour in nineteenth century capitalism, especially the 
constant threat of mechanization of work and pressure on wages, but saw this as a spur 
to action whereupon “workers begin to form combinations (Trades’ Unions) against the 
bourgeois” (Marx and Engels, 1848). Shared interests of being waged workers 
(however labour power is specifically contracted) “is a claim about material interests: 
two people within a given class have greater overlap in their material interests than do 
two people in different classes” (Wright 2016: 128). Standing “places too much 
emphasis on division, as opposed to solidarity, whether that solidarity is actual or 
aspirational” Paret (2016:117). This comes from the fact that he is critical of the idea 
of labour, and the stress of divisions reinforces the weakness of workers – something 
central to the use of precarity in the work of CK Lee, who applies it to study China’s 
working class as we discuss below.  
For Standing, class is not defined through mode of production, control and 
ownership, but an ideal type secure and insecure ‘employment situation’ – thus 
implying that workers change their class position by changing to different employment 
contracts. This, however, makes no sense when the particular configuration of contracts 
is often a human resource management strategy for recruitment purposes. For example, 
many workers are initially employed through agencies and then, after a period of 
observation by employers, transferred to regular or continuous employment positions. 
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This ‘temp-to-perm’ practice is a selection device used by large employers across the 
globe. In China, as noted in the work of Jürgens and Krzywdzinski (2016: 118) there is 
a transition to such regular employment contracts in most Chinese car plants. This is 
confirmed by Chen and Chan (2018: 9) who examined directly and indirectly employed 
workers in their sample from five auto joint ventures, and found both groups were 
concentrated on fixed terms contracts, with easy movement from agency to direct 
employment, but little opportunity for continuous contracts – which less than 10% of 
their total sample were on. Movement from indirect to direct contracts was a 
management not class strategy. Worker’s perceptions in Chen and Chan’s research was 
that job security was available when business was good, but “when the economic 
situation is not good and orders are low, they will kick us out” regardless of contract 
type (ibid: 9). In other words, precarity or casualness is the shared experience of these 
Chinese workers on direct and indirect contracts, even in good capital-intensive 
industry jobs like autos. In this work “...the attitudes of agency and regular workers 
towards the company are very similar,” (ibid: 21) and “…agency workers do not feel 
particularly discriminated against when compared to the regular workers” (ibid: 22). To 
isolate agency workers as a separate ‘precariat’ class make no sense, and highlights the 




Class formation, structure and action 
Class within a labour process tradition (Smith, 1987) supports a dynamic approach, 
where structures are explored through processes on enactment inside workplaces where 
worker-management relations are active and fluid (Smith and Liu, 2016). Class 
relations are centred on exploitative social relations of production and class agency is 
unevenly constrained and/or facilitated by the societal structures within which action is 
mutually constituted. This has global reach, the entry of China into the global economy 
meant Chinese workers were linked to workers in other countries through their common 
class positions (Pun, 2016).  
Let’s return to the most basic questions of what constitutes a class. What are the 
objective and subjective factors in defining a class, and if subjective factors usually 
refer to class consciousness and class action, what is the relationship between structure, 
consciousness and action? Marx did not provide straightforward answers to these 
relationships which are always contentious among different Marxist and non-Marxist 
social scientists (Eidlin, 2014). Based on textual analysis of Marx’s work on class, 
Dahrendorf (1959) noted that for Marx, the constitution of class was never a 
dichotomous division between structure (objective factor) and agency (subjective 
factor), but could be understood as composing of three basic components in organic 
unity. Firstly, often understood as “objective” factors, the working class shares a 
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common relationship to the means of production, and at the same time, is oppositional 
to other classes involved in the ownership and control of the process of capital 
accumulation and profit maximisation. It is in production that social antagonism is 
realized which magnifies the division in society between owners and non-owners of the 
means of production. In capitalist society, these are capitalists (bourgeoisie) and 
workers (proletariat). Even though finer divisions can be further made as new categories 
of waged labour are generated, but these subgroups are drawn into established social 
change and conflicts of the industrial society (Dahrendorf, 1959: 7). 
However, economic conditions are not in themselves sufficient for the formation 
of classes, which brings in the second component, often taken as “subjective” factors, 
where class means members will necessarily have shared perceptions of their common 
interest. This is usually termed class consciousness; but as a concept class 
consciousness is not simply an awareness of one's own class interest, but also embodies 
deeply shared views of how a class should be organized in order to advance common 
interests against other classes. In the preface to The Making of the English Working 
Class, E.P. Thompson said, “class happens when some men, as a result of common 
experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as 
between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and 
opposed to) theirs”. In other words class is a processual and relational category. Class 
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formation is also an active process, which owes as much to agency as to habituation 
within common economic positions, and which embodies a notion of historical 
relationship (Thompson, 1966: 9). Fantasia (1995) also highlights the idea of what he 
calls ‘cultures of solidarity’ to overcome the binary separation between structure and 
agency, and suggests the need to examine cultural practices, collective action and social 
organization of class in concrete terms, in his case, the American workers’ movement. 
Considering the world history of labour, the formation and maturity of the working 
class usually takes root across generations. The suffering, hardships, and grievances of 
working lives often reached their peak not in the first generation of workers but in the 
subsequent ones. This is the process of proletarianization, which turns agricultural 
labourers into industrial workers, either voluntarily or involuntarily, that runs through 
the history of world capitalism. Katznelson and Zolberg (1986) in their comparative 
studies of working-class formation in nineteenth-century Germany, France and the 
United States help discern various kinds of reaction to proletarianization and pinpoint 
a multiplicity of ways of making sense, organizing, and acting in society when the 
working class emerged. They advocate a model of class with “four connected layers of 
history and theory: those of structure, ways of life, dispositions, and collective action” 
(ibid p. 14). Importantly, for the working class, class consciousness gives rise to 
political or civic organizations such as labour organizations, trade unions, and political 
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parties in order to promote their class interests (Dahrendorf 1959: 16). In this way, class 
consciousness contributes to the awareness of class differences and conflicts, and 
potentially, a tendency to institutionalizing or organising, both in an economic and 
political sense.  
The third element of class is class struggle, of which we are guided to ask: what 
are the forces that could activate the formation of class, turning class agents into class-
aware actors? Dahrendorf argues that the organisation of classes follows the progress 
of conflicts within the sphere of production itself. As capitalism matures, social 
antagonisms deepen, and the struggle over wages turns into a struggle over political 
power (Dahrendorf, 1959: 16). This political struggle is not only regarding control over 
means of production and ownership of property in the unforeseeable future, but the 
immediate issue of the power of the working class to organise and to be organised in 
order to formulate coalitions in struggle. Fighting for economic interests, such as 
increases in wages and improvements of working conditions, grows into fighting for 
state legislation and the right to trade unionism, and thus becomes a political movement 
(Dahrendorf, 1959: 16). In short, classes are political groups united by a common 
interest, although there is not a simple convey belt process connecting movement from 
the economic to the political sphere. 
Whereas historians of the European and American experiences can look back over 
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many decades or centuries and examine the precise formation of particular working 
classes, the China story is emergent and in that sense incomplete. It needs locating 
within both an historical and political-economy context – connecting Chinese workers 
to the experiences of other working classes, to current global trends in work and 
employment (such as precariousness) and to the unique features of the particular China 
case, such as the hukou or internal passport system. The above discussion of class 
attempts to bring out its layered quality, and to reclaim the materiality of class regarding 
the primacy of production relations to the process of class formation. Class is always a 
relational concept, and class formation takes place in a temporal, social and country 
context.  
Class and precarity in China  
Chinese labour studies within a political economy or labour process perspective 
are attempting to bring class back into analysis (Liu and Smith, 2016). However, in 
China, this is particularly difficult because of the negation of socialist experience, the 
U-turn to neo-liberal capitalism and the suppression of class discourse by the state. This 
negation of class discourse, followed up by changes of socialist production relations, 
the pouring in of foreign capital, the rebirth of private capital, and last but not the least, 
the birth of a new Chinese working class, all attest to the material foundations for the 
renewal of class analysis.  
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Labour researchers disagree about the character of radicalism in the second 
generation of migrant workers, and the extent to which either a new class consciousness 
or a trade union consciousness is being consolidated (Chan and Sui, 2012, favour the 
latter, Pun, 2016 the former). These debates are about the historical process or length 
of time a “class” takes to be constituted. These writers have not employed a new 
dangerous class, the precariat, to set the terms of their debate. Others, despite problems 
around the precarity thesis, have adopted it to debate the character of the Chinese 
working class (Lee, 2016; Lee and Kofman, 2012; Swider, 2017). Lee (2016) has 
highlighted the difficulty of “making” the Chinese working class, locating it within a 
“state-civil society” framework and departing from a global capital-labor perspective 
for understanding the on-going process of class formation. By using the terms 
precarization and underclass, Lee (2016) implies a negative effect on working class 
formation in China, highlighting division and hence questioning the possibility of 
forming class solidarities among workers themselves. Lee (2016) attributes the 
divisions of the working class to the factors of migration, rural to urban divide, labour 
agency and state control. Principally, she suggests “two institutional factors 
perpetuating precarization” (Lee, 2016: 324) in China: the state’s opportunistic and 
political use of legal changes around employment and labour law, and land reforms 
separating peasants from the land. Lee describes the process of proletarianisation in the 
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countryside: “The rise of large-scale agribusiness contract farming means the de facto 
confiscation of land use rights as a form of social security. From now on, farmers’ 
livelihood is totally dependent on waged employment or corporate profits.” (ibid. 324). 
Nevertheless, by employing the language of underclass and precariousness to describe 
the increasingly landless migrant peasant workforce she underplays migrant workers 
capacity for economic struggles: “…China’s landless migrant workers find themselves 
in an emerging underclass position that is even more precarious than the conventional 
landholding migrant workers” (ibid. 324). Lee is not only pessimistic when it comes to 
attributing greater levels of resistance to the second generation of migrant workers, but 
she projects general pessimism about any change in the Chinese workforce which she 
says represents “authoritarian precarization” (a merging of labour market and state 
practices that she employs to define class). Lee says that to base class analysis on recent 
labour disputes in China is subjectivism. Disputes are transitory; institutions of the state 
incorporate and disable them. Hence action is not the starting place for class analysis. 
Rather, this should start with local and central state institutions and increasingly 
insecure employment relationships: “In this day and age of global precarization, it has 
become ever more important that labor scholars, of China or elsewhere, resist the 
temptation of subjectivism and voluntarism, and recall Gramsci’s famous motto: 
pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will”(ibid. 330). In other words, precarity 
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is used as an objective signifier of enfeebled class consciousness.  
Lee’s work has consistently downplayed workers’ power and potential labour 
resistance in reformed China. She argued that there was “collective inaction of Chinese 
workers” (1998: 3) in the 1990s when the state workers were laid off and the newly 
migrant working class was gradually formed and incipient labour actions were observed. 
Entering into the 2000s, when increasing labour strikes were recorded, Lee argued that 
only “cellular and piecemeal labour actions” (2007: 235) were possible because under 
an authoritarian state and coercive production regime, the working class is incapable of 
developing class awareness and hence no class actions would be possible. Despite 
contra empirical studies, provided by Leung and Pun (2009), Zhang (2014), Pringle 
(2017), Chan and Hui, (2016) and many others, Lee (2016) has fiercely criticised those 
who studied Chinese workers’ power and resistance for providing no evidence and 
hence these Chinese labour scholars were all trapped in “false optimism” and 
“subjectivism and voluntarism” in their studies. Lee’s argument is in fact arbitrary and 
subjective as the above- mentioned studies are based on solid empirical research on 
Chinese workers’ protests and strikes in recent years. A key reason for her argument is 
that she employed the precarity thesis which emphases fragmentation and division of 
the working class constrained by the labour market situation and employment situation 
of workers.  
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In the 1980s and the 1990s when China was incorporated into the global 
economy and turned itself into the “world’s workshop”, there were more precarious 
jobs than in the new millennium. More recent government labour legislation has moved 
to offer more protection, but this has been followed by greater labour resistance and 
collective action (Chan and Hui, 2016). Although lack of enforcement of new labour 
laws is widespread, alongside use of fixed-term contracts, in terms of labour disputes 
and collective actions, we witness a lot more in the new or second generation which is 
supported by numerous empirical studies (Leung and Pun, 2009; Pun and Lu, 2010a; 
Pun and Lu, 2010b). Contrary to Lee’s (2016) argument that agency workers weaken 
regular workers’ capacity for resistance, Pringle (2017: 5) notes that in the 2010 Honda 
parts dispute, agency workers were a critical part of the collective strike action. Thus, 
the same employment situation produced very different class actions in Honda’s strike, 
and therefore it is difficult to say, as Lee does, that precarization is the fate of the second 
generation and this determines a single field of entrapped or disempowered action. A 
question for us is why a group of workers, small or large, fighting for their economic 
interests at the point of production is not considered engagement in class action?  
Apart from the precarity thesis, Lee’s analysis assumes China is “unique”, with 
institutions like the hukou system impeding class formation. The hukou or household 
registration system was used in Maoist China as a basic unit for planning economic 
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activities such as food and other daily necessities and employment provision, and 
continues to have a positioning effect of dividing the rural population from the urban 
population (Cheng and Selden, 1994). Your hukou was set by your birth location, and 
geographical movement was very limited, and citizenship rights were tied to where you 
were registered not where you worked. The hukou regime effectively tied one’s right to 
permanent residence to place of birth, and hence migrant workers are prevented from 
establishing their own working class community.  
The perceived “uniqueness” of China in most Chinese labour studies (Blecher, 2010; 
Kuruvilla, Lee and Gallagher, 2011; Lee and Kofman, 2012) is wrongly presumed to 
locate China outside the circuits of global capitalism, and enable these studies to argue 
a de-making of class in China despite the fact that China is producing products for the 
world market as well as creating the largest working class in world history. Likewise, 
the concept of ‘unfinished proletarianisation’, put forward by Pun and Lu (2010a) is 
often mistakenly used to argue for a weak Chinese working class lacking in identity, 
consciousness and action. However, according to Pun’s recent study (2016), unfinished 
proletarianisation would not affect the making of class forces as it analyses a tougher 
economic situation affecting workers entering the production sphere, resulting in severe 
class conflicts and generating more class action. The hegemonic state discourse 
employed to deny that “peasant-workers” are proper workers, and create a legal identity 
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problem for these migrant workers, does not alter the fact that peasant-workers are 
structurally positioned as “waged workers”—a starting point used to discuss the 
formation of a working class as noted above. 
The complication of class formation in China 
When China transformed itself into the world’s factory and became a 
contemporary industrialised society, it re-enacted a common phenomenon in the world 
history of capitalism. For example, the making of the English working class in the 
nineteenth century, the experiences of the “Four Tigers” of East Asian countries in the 
twentieth century, or the transformative experiences of countries in South Asian and 
Latin American today. All these countries underwent a rapid rural-to-urban 
transformation, which relied on a working class that migrates from rural areas to settle 
in urban communities. Everywhere we can find examples of rural migrant workers 
streaming from the countryside to work and build industrial cities. These rural workers 
were able to stay in the city where they established family homes and larger 
communities. What is special about China is its peculiar process of proletarianisation: 
in order to incorporate the Chinese socialist system into the global economy, rural 
workers are called upon to work in the city but not to stay in the city. For China’s new 
working class, industrialisation and urbanisation are still two highly disconnected 
processes as the peasant-workers are deprived of their rights to live where they work 
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due to the hukou system. These disconnected processes obviously complicate the 
formation of a Chinese working class which is constrained by state control, hegemonic 
discourse as well as the direction of capital.  
The 270 million migrant labourers in China today who, for three decades, have 
laboured in foreign or privately-owned factories, are still deprived of the legal and 
social rights to reside in the city or to set up their own working-class communities. 
Despite these constraints migrant workers have not stopped trying to stay in the city, 
either as temporary sojourners or de facto urban residents, jumping from workplace to 
workplace, and city to city. The new generation of migrant workers has realized that 
they will always be considered second-class citizens by urban governments, which 
recognizes no obligation to provide them with housing, medical care, education, or 
other social services.  
However, legal status does not affect the process of forming a class identity. The 
materiality of class being defined by production relations and the opposition between 
capital and labour instead of the personal identity or employment contracts of workers. 
What we call them, for example, migrant peasant-workers, does not change their 
production relations, that is, the materiality of class. It does, however, when applied by 
the state, affect the process of class awareness and consciousness. In theory, providing 
migrant workers a legally complicated worker identity would affect the cognitive 
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recognition of themselves as a class. Yet, in practice, the deepening process of capital-
labour conflicts facilitates their oppositional awareness of their class situation resulting 
in more action not less.  
Organising the unorganised: class conflicts and class actions  
Moving into the new millennium, a new generation of migrant workers has gradually 
become aware of their class position and participated in a widening series of collective 
actions, as reported by various recent studies (Chan 2012; Friedman 2014; Zhang 2014; 
Chan and Hui 2016; Pringle 2017). Migrant workers are now experiencing a deeper 
sense of anger and dissatisfaction than that of the first generation, accompanied by the 
realization that they are increasingly cut adrift from economic activity in their home 
town (Pun, 2016). The structure of production and domination embedded in the 
dormitory labour regime of the “factory of the world” embodies a new labouring subject 
of resistance (Pun and Smith, 2006; Smith and Pun, 2007).  
Recent years have further seen increasing numbers of collective actions among migrant 
workers pursuing delayed wages, demanding compensation for injury or death, or 
pressurizing enterprises to increase wages and living allowances. “According to the 
CLB [China Labour Bulletin] (2016), the number of labour strikes and protests in 2015 
in China reached 2774, more double the number for 2014 (Chan and Hui, 2016: 9-10).  
Elfstrom (2017) explores the different data bases on the incidents of strikes in China. 
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Below are two different sources that confirm the same trend; namely increases in strikes 
in recent years. This supports other empirical claims of more disputes being associated 
with the new generation of migrant workers.  
 
Table 1 & 2 here 
 
Labour shortages enhances bargaining power of Chinese workers and “has great 
implications for the balance of power between capital and labour in the post-crisis 
period” (Chan and Hui, 2016: 5). Worker actions include legal litigation, such as suing 
subcontractors or companies (Chen and Xu 2012), as well as collective actions such as 
sit-ins, strikes, and even suicidal behaviour (Pun, et al., 2014). Workers took action to 
confront capital at the point of production in the workplace as well as challenging power 
at societal levels in the courtroom, on the street, or in front of government buildings. 
We can illustrate the character of these actions through the case of Foxconn workers, 
the best known representative company-case of the second generation of migrant 
workers struggles.  
Foxconn workers are most often associated with the suicide wave that happened 
in the factory compounds in 2010. By comparison, their resistance and collective action 
has hardly been reported or studied. Our research on Foxconn workers in the past seven 
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years, has however, recorded stoppages, sit-ins, demonstrations and even riots in 
different Foxconn facilities (Pun, 2016). Foxconn, the world’s largest electronics 
company, employs more than one million workers in China. During the first half of 
2012, Foxconn launched a huge recruitment campaign to gear up production at the 
Taiyuan plant. A brief strike did not win workers a wage rise. Grievances over wages 
and benefits, speed-ups, and humiliating treatment of workers remained unaddressed. 
At 11 p.m. on September 23, 2012 a few security officers severely beat two workers for 
failing to show their staff IDs. A “bloody fight” between several security officers and 
workers at the factory’s industrial dormitory followed. Workers from the same ethnicity 
were called upon to join the fighting, and the screams of the victims, alerted many 
others in the darkness. A riot eventually broke out. Tens of thousands of workers 
smashed security offices, production facilities, shuttle buses, motorbikes, cars, shops, 
and canteens in the dormitory and factory complexes. Many others broke windows, 
demolished company fences, and pillaged factory supermarkets and convenience stores. 
Workers also overturned police cars and set them ablaze.  
Running through from midnight until the following day, workers rioted at the 
80,000-worker Foxconn Taiyuan factory, causing the shutdown of entire production 
lines and disrupting the manufacturing of iPhone metal parts. This industrial action is 
worth noting not only because of the scale of protest, but also that the workers’ leaders 
were able to voice their condemnation of the whole production system, demonstrating 
their agency and power through collective actions. Zhonghong, aged 21, with two years’ 
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work experience at Foxconn and his co-workers made overt demands to the company 
and its union. His open letter to Foxconn CEO Terry Gou beautifully ends with three 
“remembers”: 
 
Please remember, from now on, to treat your subordinates as humans, and 
require them to treat their subordinates, and their subordinates, and their 
subordinates, as humans. 
 
Please remember, from now on, to change your attitude that Taiwanese are 
superior, those of you who are riding a rocket of fast promotions and earning 
wages as high as heaven compared to those on earth. 
 
Please remember, from now on, to reassign the responsibilities of the company 
union so that genuine trade unions can play their due role. 
 
Many in this new cohort of migrant workers – second and even third generation 
youth who grew up living and working in the cities – are experiencing grievances and 
anger: “always yelled at,” “self-respect trampled mercilessly,” holding low-waged jobs, 
and at best, with slight chances to advancement via education or training (PUN, 2016). 
Zhonghong and his co-workers are now standing up to defend their dignity and rights 
through direct class action. This is particularly telling at a time when China has begun 
its transit from a nation with a large labour surplus and a relatively youthful population, 
to one with tight labour markets and aging population, a situation that is driving wages 
higher and prompting corporations to transfer operations to lower wage areas in China’s 
interior.  
The language of “rights” used in workers’ strikes and industrial riots should not 
narrowly be confined to the realm of legal rights. For human dignity and the shared 
interests of workers living “at the lowest level” in Foxconn, Zhonghong angrily called 
for talks with CEO Terry Gou “on an equal footing.” The sense of equity was embedded 
in the workers’ worldview with a strong desire to call for fair treatment. He also 
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demanded the right for worker organization from senior management and requested a 
genuine union be set up from the local government in order to protect the workers 
(Leung, 2015).  
Migrant workers have also formed grassroots labour NGOs to fight for their 
own rights and interests. This is an expression of the political dimension of class action, 
no matter how incipient. Many labour NGOs were formed by former workers or 
workers’ leaders with direct involvement in strikes or labour disputes, where they 
became experienced in advocacy or nurturing labour activism and spreading 
experiences to different cities of China. Notable examples include the Shenzhen 
Chunfeng Labour Dispute Service Centre found by Zhang Zhiru and the Foshan 
Nanfeiyang Social Work Service Centre headed by He Xiaobo. Zhang, a worker 
formerly employed in an electric plant in Shenzhen, was injured at work and fractured 
his clavicle in 2002. Being unable to obtain compensation for medical expenses from 
the factory owner, the anger towards injustice and unfairness has sparked his idea of 
doing something for migrant workers like himself. He first attempted to found a trade 
union in another plant in an industrial district, but failed due to the intervention by both 
management and local cadres. As the unionising attempts were fruitless, Zhang turned 
to the NGO approach and established the Shenzhen Chunfeng Labour Dispute Service 
Centre in 2004 (Ng and Pun, 2017).  
The suppression of labour NGOs in the recent years, coincides with increasing 
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class conflicts perceived as threatening “social stability” in the eyes of Chinese 
government. Lacking social capital and institutional channels to voice their grievances, 
the migrant working class now mobilises mass protests to demonstrate their discontent 
and resist suppression. China’s political regime has striven to legitimise governance by 
placing class struggle approaches within the law and related institutions as an arena to 
mediate conflict through the courts rather than in the streets (Gallagher, 2006; Gallagher 
and Dong, 2011). New legal provisions passed since 2008, tested by workers in the 
labour dispute arbitration committees and courts, and particularly worker victories, 
were said to contribute to raising worker consciousness of labour rights by labour NGOs.  
In recent years, the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) has frequently 
attacked labour NGOs as “foreign oppositional forces” and demanded replacing these 
“illegal organisations” by reformed workplace unions. China’s labour NGOs have thus 
become increasingly contradictory. While some have conducted tactical 
experimentation to develop lower risk mobilisation strategies (Fu, 2016), many labour 
NGO practitioners have turned to a non-confrontational stance, self-limiting themselves 
to service provisions and so earning some legitimacy from the party-state. The harsh 
suppression of labour NGOs leaders obviously would affect the future development of 
labour organisations in China, but most importantly, recent widespread arrests, which 
have been widely reported, serve to undermine the argument that labour NGOs are 
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useless, serving as anti-solidarity machine for the sake of state co-optation and social 
stability (Lee and Shen, 2011). 
Conclusion 
Precariousness as a description of labour conditions may be a useful concept, the 
precariat is not. At different times precariousness is a more or less important attribute 
of being a worker. The processes of creating non-standard forms of employment is 
recognisable across the world of work, from unskilled manual workers to more white-
collar and professional employment (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick, 2017). The 
idea that security is a basis for class differentiation is unhelpful as is the idea of a new 
class called the ‘precariat’. More importantly, we need to look at interactions between 
workers on different contracts in production relations, and not invent employment 
differences that confuse employment situation and social class.  
The precarious situation of Chinese workers is evident in the research we have 
referenced in this paper. In China, there is political-institutional dualism in the form of 
the operation of the hukou system which effectively limits entry to some jobs in 
government or state-owned enterprises to only those with appropriate citizenship rights. 
Migrant workers working away from home are excluded from local social security and 
their children from public education. These social discriminations provide migrant 
workers with unique and unprotected employment situation which is further exploited 
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in the sphere of production by capital, often with the aid of the state. Capital usually 
divides labour into core and temporary segments, but the labour struggles driven by 
class conflicts, increasingly unite those in regular and precarious employment situations, 
especially in times of crisis and collective action. Moreover, universal casualness, rather 
than contract segmentation between core and insecure workers characterizes Chinese 
workplaces (Chen and Chan, 2018). Direct and indirectly employed workers both sell 
their time for wages, putting them squarely at the grid of capital conflicts, however their 
contracts are defined. We suggest that it is unscientific to predict the behaviour of 
workers based on employment type and underestimate collective class forces and action. 
Paradoxically Chinese migrant workers have both had increased insecurity and 
increased militancy; and precarity is therefore not a reliable predictor of class action. 
Workers due to structural antagonism to capital and employers are pressed into 
combined struggles, even though their legal situation may be disadvantageous. They 
may lack secure employment contracts, legal labour rights with an employer, but they 
can band together along lines of common class interest in cultures of solidarity.  
With the rise of a new working class in China, the new generation of peasant-workers 
are now increasingly proletarianised through their class situation and class action. 
Concomitantly, their old ownership rights in the countryside have disappeared or are 
disappearing, making any return to petty-ownership status as farmers impossible. This 
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double movement, dispossession of land rights and possession of industrial worker 
consciousness, has seen China change its class relations. The migrant workers are now 
experiencing a deeper sense of anger and dissatisfaction than that of the first generation, 
accompanied by the realisation that they are increasingly cut off – there is no return to 
economic security in their home town but they are rapidly forming into a class force at 
a national level.  
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